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A rose by any other name: how the United States
charges its service members for violating
the laws of war
chris jenks

I Introduction
In the early morning of 11 March 2012, a US service-member, Staﬀ
Sergeant Robert Bales, slipped undetected from Village Stability Platform
Belambai (VSP) about 30 kilometres from Kandahar, Afghanistan. Bales
was one of approximately forty US military personnel deployed to VSP
Belambai. Their mission was ‘to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security, reconstructing the country, training the national police
and army, and providing a lawful environment for free and fair elections’.1
Sergeant Bales, however, was on a very diﬀerent mission.
Bales, alone and on foot, hiked to two separate Afghan villages where he
murdered sixteen women and children, attempted to murder six more, and
assaulted others.2 The victims ranged in age from small children to an
elderly grandmother. Bales murdered eleven members of one family,
shooting most of them in front of one another, stomped to death at least
one victim and set ten victims’ bodies on ﬁre. The US Army apprehended
Bales as he attempted to return to VSB Belambai. The Army transferred
Bales to the United States and military conﬁnement and prosecuted him
under the US military’s criminal law and procedure, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). At an Army court martial held in June 2013 in the
United States, Bales pleaded guilty to sixteen counts of premeditated
murder, six counts of attempted murder and six counts of aggravated
Borrowing from Shakespeare’s, Romeo and Juliet: ‘What’s in a name? That which we call a
rose. By any other name would smell as sweet.’
1
United States Mission to NATO, U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan & Pakistan: A Dossier
(2014) United States Mission to NATO http://nato.usmission.gov/afghanistan.html.
2
United States v Robert Bales, Charge Sheet (23 March 2012) (redacted). A redacted version
of the charge sheet is available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2012/images/03/23/bales
.charge.pdf.
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assault inﬂicting grievous bodily injury. A military panel, or jury, sentenced Bales to be dishonourably discharged and to be conﬁned for the
duration of his natural life without the possibility of parole.
In so doing, the US Army continued its long-standing policy and
practice of asserting jurisdiction over its service members who commit
crimes during armed conﬂict and charging them with enumerated
oﬀences of the UCMJ rather than violations of the laws of war, or war
crimes. Yet, while not prosecuting its own service members with such
crimes, the United States continues to conduct military commissions at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and to prosecute members of al Qaeda and the
Taliban for just such oﬀences, that is, violations of the laws of war.
This chapter examines the US practice of not charging its service
members with war crimes. The chapter brieﬂy explains how the United
States asserts criminal jurisdiction over its service members before turning
to how the US military reports violations of the laws of war. It then sets out
the US methodology for charging such violations as applied to its service
members, and compares this methodology to that applied to those tried by
military commissions. The chapter then discusses the varied meanings of
the term ‘war crimes’ and the way in which the 1949 Geneva Conventions
can provide a benchmark against which the elements of oﬀences, and their
punishments, can be compared. While the US practice fares adequately in
this comparison, the argument for a pragmatic approach to charging over
the expressive value of a war crime charge is rendered untenable as a result
of the disparate manner in which the United States charges detainees when
compared to its own service members.

II US practice
A History of the UCMJ
The UCMJ resulted from the US Congress’ desire, following World War
II, to establish a ‘a code that would apply to all branches of the military
and create greater uniformity in the substantive and procedural law
governing the administration of military justice’.3 While the UCMJ
dates from 1951, its origins are in and with the founding of the United
States during the American Revolutionary War with England. In June
1775, the ﬂedging (and rebellious) Second Continental Congress enacted
the Articles of War, which, somewhat ironically were ‘generally a copy of
3

Mynda G. Ohman, ‘Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title 10: A Proposal to Amend
the Uniform Code of Military Justice’ (2005) 57 Air Force Law Review, p. 1 at 4.
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the then-existing code governing England’s “ministerial army”’.4
Following the Revolutionary War, the US Constitution granted the US
Congress the power ‘(1) to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of land and naval Forces’; and ‘(2) to deﬁne and punish . . .
oﬀenses against the Law of Nations’.5 Thus, beginning with the 1806
revisions to the Articles of War, US ‘military personnel were subject to a
code that required them to obey certain laws and customs of war or face
trial by court-martial or military tribunal’.6 In the century that followed,
the US Congress updated the Articles of War in 1874 and 1916.7 The
articles were again amended in 1920, with lessons learned from World
War I, and in 1949 following World II.8 The 1951 UCMJ replaced the
Articles of War and established ‘a single codiﬁed system of military law,
separate from the criminal justice systems of the various states and of the
Article III [federal] courts’.9 The features of the UCMJ have been
described as follows:
The UCMJ permanently transformed the nature of military law. The
UCMJ was more than a structural change to ensure uniformity across
all branches of service. It added articles, deﬁned new crimes, and established rules designed to protect the substantive and procedural rights of
military personnel. New provisions designed to ensure a fair trial included
the right against self-incrimination; equal process for the defense and
prosecution to obtain witnesses and depositions; the prohibition on
receiving guilty pleas in capital cases; the requirement that both prosecution and defense counsel be legally trained; the right for an enlisted
accused to be tried by a panel [military jury] that included enlisted
members; the requirement that the law oﬃcer (now the military judge)
instruct the panel members on the record regarding the elements of the
oﬀense, presumption of innocence, and burden of proof; the provision
mandating that voting on ﬁndings and sentencing be conducted by secret
ballot; and an automatic review of the trial record.10

One of the advantages of the UCMJ is its broad jurisdictional scope.
4

5

6

7
10

Judge Advocate General’s Corps, US Army, The Army Lawyer: A History of the Judge
Advocate General’s Corps, 1775–1975 (Washington, DC, Government Printing Oﬃce,
1975), p. 7. The following month the Congress elected William Tudor as the ﬁrst Judge
Advocate General of the Army.
United States Constitution art. 1 § 8 cl. 14. See also Tara Lee, ‘American Courts-Martial
for Enemy War Crimes’ (2003) 33 University of Baltimore Law Review, p. 49 at 52–53.
Eric Talbot Jensen and James J Teixeira Jr, ‘Prosecuting Members of the U.S. Military for
Wartime Environmental Crimes’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law
Review, p. 651 at 658.
8
9
Ohman, above n. 3, at 4.
Ibid.
Lee, above n. 5, at 52–53.
Ohman, above n. 3, at 9–10.
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The UCMJ applies to all [US] service members regardless of whether the
oﬀense can be tied to military discipline and eﬀectiveness. The UCMJ is
applicable both in the United States and in foreign countries. Because the
UCMJ applies worldwide, a court-martial convened under the UCMJ may
be held anywhere in the world. This ﬂexibility allows for the prosecution
to take place near the situs of the crime, presumably near the location of
any relevant witnesses. This makes the prosecution of a crime that occurs
during the conduct of military operations, such as in Iraq [or
Afghanistan], easier than it would be if the case had to be heard in a
Federal District Court or before an international body convened at the
Hague or some other site distant from the court’s location.11

For the UCMJ to have personal jurisdiction over US service-members
regardless of where in the world the service-member is or whether they
were on or oﬀ duty is one of the strengths of the system. But the manner
in which the system charges US service members for crimes blunts the
eﬃcacy, either real or perceived, of the UCMJ as an accountability
mechanism.

B Charging violations of the laws of war
As one US Army lawyer noted in a primer for the practitioner of charging
war crimes, ‘[t]he ﬁrst step in analyzing how to charge the service
member is to look for any oﬀenses speciﬁcally enumerated in the
UCMJ Articles 80 through 132’.12 These articles address a wide range
11

12

Jensen and Teixeira, above n. 6, at 658. Although one of the advantages of the UCMJ is the
ability to hold courts martial in a combat theatre such as Iraq or Afghanistan, it is
noteworthy that often the US military does not choose this course of action. As discussed
in the introduction, Staﬀ Sergeant Bales committed his crimes in Afghanistan and against
Afghan civilians, but Bales’ court martial was held in the United States.
Martin N. Watt, ‘Charging War Crimes: A Primer for the Practitioner’ (February 2006)
Army Lawyer, p. 2. As Watt explains, ‘[t]he [service lawyer prosecutor] should begin with
this analysis due to the preemption doctrine’. The preemption doctrine ‘prohibits application of Article 134 to conduct covered in Articles 80 through 132’. Id. Article 134 is for
misconduct not addressed in the enumerated punitive section of the UCMJ. Article 134 of
the UCMJ, among other things, allows for the incorporation of federal oﬀences as a
military charge. But under the preemption doctrine, a prosecutor may not incorporate a
federal charge to address conduct an enumerated article of the UCMJ covers. For
example, Article 118 of the UCMJ criminalises murder. The US Code, in Title 18 §
1111 also criminalises murder. Therefore a military prosecutor would need to charge the
murder oﬀence under Article 118; he or she could not incorporate the federal murder
oﬀence through Article 134. However, unlike the UCMJ, the US Code speciﬁcally
criminalises war crimes as such, in Title 18 § 2441. This raises the question of whether
a military prosecutor could incorporate the federal statute under Article 134 and thus
charge a US service member with war crimes. The answer where the underlying conduct
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of criminal conduct, and include both completed and inchoate oﬀences.
The crimes listed in the UCMJ include common oﬀences such as larceny,
assault, rape and murder and arcane oﬀences, such as abusing a public
animal and jumping from a vessel to the water. There is no enumerated
oﬀence for violating the laws of war. Yet the UCMJ itself acknowledges
that ‘[t]o the extent permitted by the [US] Constitution, courts-martial
may try any oﬀense under the code, and in the case of a general courtsmartial, the law of war’.13
In explaining how to allege oﬀences, the current US Manual for CourtMartial states that ‘[a] charge states the article of the code, law of war, or
local penal law of an occupied territory which the accused is alleged to
have violated’.14 Not only does this indicate the possibility of a law of war
charge, the accompanying discussion details that ‘[i]n the case of a person
subject to trial by general court-martial for violations of the law of war,
the charge should be: “Violation of the Law of War”’.15 But that discussion concludes with the guidance that ‘[o]rdinarily persons subject to the
code [a category which includes US service members] should be charged
with a speciﬁc violation of the code rather than a violation of the law of
war’.16 Likewise, the Department of the Army’s ﬁeld manual, The Law of
Land Warfare, in a section entitled Persons Charged with War Crimes,
states that ‘The United States normally punishes war crimes as such only
if they are committed by enemy nationals or by persons serving the
interests of the enemy State. Violations of the law of war committed by
persons subject to the military law of the United States will usually

13

14
15
16

is reﬂected in a punitive article is unclear. For example, if a military prosecutor incorporated the federal war crimes statute and charged a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions, the unlawful killing of a protected person, the defence would challenge
such a charge under the preemption doctrine, arguing that Article 118 of the UCMJ
already addresses unlawful killing. But to the extent the underlying conduct is not
reﬂected in a punitive article of the UCMJ, charging the conduct as a war crime through
Article 134 and the federal statute appears a possibility. The challenge is to identify acts
which constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions or violate Common Article 3
and which are not already reﬂected in a punitive article of the UCMJ.
Manual for Courts-Martial, Rules for Courts-Martial r. 202 (2012). See also Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 818 art. 18 (2010).
Manual for Courts-Martial, Rules for Courts-Martial r. 307(c)(2) (2012).
Ibid., Discussion (D).
Ibid. The analysis of that rule, also contained in the Manual for Courts-Martial, adds little
clarity. The appendix to the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial merely states that ‘[i]n the
case of a person subject to trial by general court-martial by the law of war . . ., the Charge
should be: “Violation of the Law of War”’: Manual for Courts-Martial (1969) Appendix 6a
at [12]. That same manual lists as a source of military jurisdiction, international law,
which it states includes the laws of war.
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constitute violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, if so,
will be prosecuted under that law.’17
That guidance, while not styled as an absolute requirement, has proved
to be one in US practice. For example, the US charged Lieutenant Calley
with violating Article 118, Murder, of the UCMJ, for his role in the Mei Lai
massacre during the Vietnam War. There is considerable similarity
between the charges against Calley and Bales. Calley was charged as follows:
In that First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr . . . did, at My Lai 4, Quang
Ngai Province, Republic of South Viet-Nam, on or about 16 March 1968,
with premeditation, murder an unknown number, not less than seventy,
Oriental human beings, males and females of various ages, whose names
are unknown, occupants of the village of My Lai 4, by means of shooting
them with a riﬂe.18

Bales was charged as follows: ‘[i]n that Staﬀ Sergeant (E-6) Robert Bales,
U.S. Army, did, at or near Belambay, Afghanistan, on or about 11 March
2012, with premeditation, murder a female of apparent Afghan descent
known as [redacted] by means of shooting her with a ﬁrearm’.19
The historian for the US Army Judge Advocate Generals’ Corps claims
that the United States has never charged a US service member with a law
of war violation as such.20 But one commentator, Professor (and former
Army lawyer) Jordan Paust, claims that the United States charged a
service member during the Vietnam War with ‘cutting oﬀ an ear from
the body of an unknown dead Viet Cong soldier, which conduct was of a
nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces of the United States as a
violation of the Law of War’.21
The legislative intent behind Rule for Court Martial 307, or the commentary, provides no clariﬁcation. Noted Army legal scholars, and
17

18

19

20
21

Department of the Army Field Manual FM 27–10 The Law of Land Warfare (July 1956)
at [507].
United States v. First Lieutenant William L Calley, Jr, Charge Sheet (5 September 1969)
Speciﬁcation 1. Similar action was taken with respect to Calley’s Company Commander,
Captain Medina. ‘In keeping with United States policy, Captain Medina was not charged
with violations of the law of war, but rather, was charged with violations of the UCMJ.’
Michael L. Smidt, ‘Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in
Contemporary Military Operations’ (2000) 164 Military Law Review, p. 155, at 194.
United States v. Robert Bales, Charge Sheet (23 March 2012) (redacted) Charge I,
Speciﬁcation 1.
Email from Fred Borch to author, 6 November 2012.
Jordan Paust, ‘My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility’ (1972) 57
Military Law Review, p. 99, at 118 (referring to United States v. Passantino, Hq. 1st Inf.
Div. Special Court-Martial Or-der No. 11, 11 February 1968).
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military justice practitioners, claim that, as stated in the Manual for
Courts-Martial, the United States may court-martial a US service member for a violation of the law of war.22 The US Congress has also failed to
provide an answer, although it brieﬂy discussed the issue in 1996. During
the debate on the War Crimes Act, members of Congress discussed the
potential for US service members to be court-martialled for violating the
law of war and determined that it ‘was not a viable option’.23

C Commissions
The US military’s internal practice stands in stark contrast to that of the
military commissions, the stated purpose of which is to ‘try alien unprivileged enemy belligerents for violations of the law of war’.24 The Military
Commissions Act of 2009 lists a host of law of war violations, including
murder of a protected person, attacking civilian objects and property,
pillaging and the denial of quarter.25 In its zeal to charge law of war
oﬀences in the commissions, the United States added the qualiﬁer ‘in
violation of the law of war’ to other charges, such as murder and destruction of property, when no such crimes exist, at least in the traditional,
international, conception of the law.26 But before the US approach can be
evaluated and discussed, clariﬁcations to the terminology are warranted.

III War crimes
A common misconception is that any violation of the Geneva
Conventions is a war crime.27 First, the Conventions do not utilise the
term war crimes. Instead, each of the four Conventions details violations
22

23
25

26

27

Jan E. Aldykiewicz and Geoﬀrey S. Corn, ‘Authority to Court-Martial Non-U.S. Military
Personnel for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed During
Internal Armed Conﬂicts’ (2001) 167 Military Law Review, 74, at 76.
Ibid. 24 Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 USC § 948b(a) (2009).
Ibid., § 950t(1). Given the US’ opposition to the ICC, the similarities between criminal
oﬀences under the Rome Statute and the Military Commissions Act of 2009 are interesting. That a US citizen could not be subject to prosecution for such oﬀences by military
commission reinforces a common US stereotype: the United States holds itself to a lower
standard than that it claims others should meet under international law.
See John Dehn, ‘The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal Oﬀence: The
Common Law Origins of “Murder in Violation of the Law of War”’ (2009) 7(1) Journal of
International Criminal Justice, p. 63.
The US Army’s own ﬁeld manual on the Law of Land Warfare is, at least in part, to blame.
It states, that ‘[t]he term “war crime” is the technical expression for a violation of the law
of war by any person or persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the law of war is a
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that constitute a ‘grave breach’ of the particular Convention. For those
violations, States Parties have agreed to enact legislation to provide
‘eﬀective penal sanction’.28 The Conventions refer to lesser violations as
‘other than grave breaches’, for which States Parties agree to ‘take measures necessary for the suppression’ of such acts.29

A International law
In its study of international humanitarian law, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) attempted to identify the customary
international law principles of international humanitarian law. Rule 156 of
the study states that ‘serious violations of international humanitarian law
constitute war crimes’.30 In response, the legal advisers to the United States
Departments of Defense and State wrote a letter to the ICRC claiming that
the term war crimes ‘is an amorphous term used in diﬀerent contexts to
mean diﬀerent things’.31 The United States stated that:
The national legislation cited in the commentary to Rule 157 employs
a variety of deﬁnitions of ‘war crimes’, only a few of which closely parallel
the deﬁnition apparently employed by the Study, and none that matches
it exactly. Much of the legislation cited does not precisely deﬁne ‘war
crimes’ . . . Although the military manuals of Croatia, Hungary, and
Switzerland, among others, appear to deﬁne ‘war crimes’ as ‘grave breaches’,
the lack of speciﬁcity leaves the intended meaning ambiguous. Even among
the few States that employ a deﬁnition of ‘war crimes’ similar to that in Rule
156, no State deﬁnition mirrors the Study’s deﬁnition precisely.32

Part of the diﬃculty stems from what constitutes ‘serious’. This is then
compounded by the deﬁnition of international humanitarian law. US

28

29
30

31

32

war crime’: Department of the Army Field Manual 27–10 The Law of Land Warfare
(1956) at [499].
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, in
force 21 October 1950, 75 UNTS 135 art. 129 (Geneva Convention III).
Ibid.
Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conﬂict’
(2005) 87(857) International Review of the Red Cross: Customary Law, p. 175 at 211, r. 156
(‘ICRC Study’).
John B. Bellinger III and William J. Haynes II, ‘A US Government Response to the
International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International
Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89(866) International Review of the Red Cross, p. 443, at 467.
Rule 157 provides that ‘States have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national
courts over war crimes.’
Ibid.

how the united states charges its service members 373

federal law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
provide similar deﬁnitions which serve as a starting point for a comparison to their counterpart under the UCMJ.
US federal law provides that ‘[w]hoever, whether inside or outside the
United States, commits a war crime . . . shall be ﬁned under this title or
imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to
the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death’.33 Pursuant to this
approach, a war crime includes grave breaches of any of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, certain articles from the 1907 Hague Convention IV, grave
breaches of article 3 common to each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and certain violations of Protocol II of the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices.
The Rome Statute deﬁnes war crimes as grave breaches of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, ‘serious violations of the laws and customs’ applicable to international and other than international armed conﬂict, and
serious violations of article 3 common to each of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.34

IV Elements comparison
How then do the elements (and punishments) of Rome Statute war
crimes compare to an analogous charge under the UCMJ? This section
compares the following oﬀences: wilful killing, committing outrages
33

34

War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 USC § 2441 (1996). Under the federal law, the term ‘war
crime’ means any conduct:
(1) deﬁned as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva
12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a
party;
(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV,
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907;
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as deﬁned in subsection (d))
when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conﬂict not of an
international character; or
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conﬂict and contrary to the provisions of the
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on
3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or
causes serious injury to civilians.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, in force 1 July 2002, 2187
UNTS 90 art. 8 (Rome Statute).
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against personal dignity, wilfully causing great suﬀering or serious injury,
and extensive destruction of property.
The elements for each war crime under the Rome Statute include that
the conduct took place ‘in the context of and was associated with’ an
armed conﬂict and that the accused was aware of that conﬂict. Yet the
introduction to the elements explains that:
There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to the
existence of an armed conﬂict or its character as international or noninternational;
In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conﬂict as international or non-international;
There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conﬂict that is
implicit in the terms ‘took place in the context of and was associated
with’.35

A Wilful killing
Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Rome Statute provides the following elements for
the crime of wilful killing to be committed in an international armed
conﬂict:
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conﬂict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established
the existence of an armed conﬂict.36
Article 118 of the UCMJ provides as follows:
1. That a certain named or described person is dead.
2. That the death resulted from the act or omission of the accused.
3. That the killing was unlawful.
35

36

International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, Doc No. ICC-ASP/1/3 (part II-B)
(adopted 9 September 2002) art. 8 (Elements of Crimes).
Ibid., art. 8(2)(a)(i).
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4. That, at the time of the killing, the accused had a premeditated design
to kill.37
The maximum punishment under the UCMJ is death. There is a mandatory minimum of imprisonment for life with eligibility for parole. For
the ICC crimes, the maximum punishment for war crimes is ‘life imprisonment when justiﬁed by the extreme gravity of the crime and the
individual circumstances of the convicted person’.38
Facially, the diﬀerences between the UCMJ and the ICC Statute are a
higher mens rea in case of the UCMJ (premeditation) and the fact that
wilful killing under the ICC requires proving both the protected status of
the victim and the underlying existence of an armed conﬂict.
Qualitatively wilful killing is a more circumspect oﬀence, proscribing a
rule not against any wilful killing, but the wilful killing of a certain class of
victims – protected persons.
Could Staﬀ Sergeant Bales be charged with wilful killing? Even with the
expansion of protected person status to include ethnicity and not just
nationality,39 the alleged victims were not protected persons for the
purposes of the Geneva Conventions. They were Afghan nationals,
allegedly killed in Afghanistan by a member of the US military when
the US military was neither ﬁghting against nor occupying Afghanistan,
but instead aiding the government of Afghanistan in its counter-insurgency eﬀorts. Thus, while the oﬀence of wilful killing is uniquely tailored
to armed conﬂict, it proves less useful in certain conﬂict based settings
than the more general murder charge under the UCMJ.

B Maltreatment of persons
Article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the Elements of Crimes outlines the elements of the
crime ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ as follows:
1. The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more persons.
2. The severity of the humiliation, degradation or other violation was of
such degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal
dignity.
37
38
39

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 918 art. 118 (2010).
Rome Statute, above n. 34, art. 77 (1).
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000) at 3.
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3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conﬂict.
4. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established
the existence of an armed conﬂict.
In article 93 of the UCMJ ‘cruelty and maltreatment’ is deﬁned as:
1. That a certain person was subject to the orders of the accused.
2. That the accused was cruel toward, or oppressed, or maltreated that
person.
In the UCMJ the maximum punishment is dishonourable discharge,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and conﬁnement for one year.
Once more the Rome Statute provides for a maximum term of thirty
years or life in particularly grave circumstances. Attention is immediately drawn to the brevity of the UCMJ charge (it contains only two
elements) as well as the disparity between possible punishments: one
year compared to thirty years. Arguably the UCMJ charge is not
analogous to the ICC oﬀence, or certainly not a complete equivalent.
The UCMJ charge requires that the victim be subject to the orders of
the accused. While being subject to orders is broadly deﬁned, it is
nonetheless a signiﬁcant limitation on the application of the charge.
Finally, under the UCMJ oﬀence the victim must be alive. By comparison, an outrage against personal dignity better lends itself to the
misconduct that occurs during armed conﬂict, particularly towards
corpses.40 For outrages against personal dignity, the Elements of
Crimes provides that ‘“persons” can include dead persons. It is understood that the victim need not personally be aware of the existence of
the humiliation or degradation or other violation. This element takes
into account relevant aspects of the cultural background of the
victim.’41

40

41

For example, some of the actions US service members have taken in recent years in
Afghanistan, including urinating on, or burning, corpses; videotaping and photographing
themselves with corpses and cutting oﬀ body parts as trophies could fall within this crime.
In Iraq, the Abu Ghraib abuses could constitute such violations. As the detainees were
subject to the orders of the US military guards cruelty and maltreatment could (and did)
apply. In such situations, the question becomes whether a maximum sentence of one year
conﬁnement is adequate.
Elements of Crimes, above n. 35, art. 8(2)(c)(ii).

how the united states charges its service members 377

C Wilfully causing great suﬀering or serious injury
Article 8(2)(a)(iii) provides that the crime of wilfully causing great
suﬀering or serious injury to body or health occurs when:
1. The perpetrator caused great physical or mental pain or suﬀering to,
or serious injury to body or health of, one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were protected under one or more of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conﬂict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established
the existence of an armed conﬂict.42
According to Article 128 of the UCMJ aggravated assault occurs in the
following circumstances:
1. That the accused attempted to do, oﬀered to do, or did bodily harm to
a certain person;
2. That the accused did so with a certain weapon, means, or force;
3. That the attempt, oﬀer, or bodily harm was done with unlawful force
or violence; and
4. That the weapon, means, or force was used in a manner likely to
produce death or grievous bodily harm.43
There are a number of subsets of this oﬀence, including when a ﬁrearm is
used and when it is committed against a child under the age of sixteen
years. Absent one of those qualiﬁers, the maximum punishment is a
dishonourable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and conﬁnement for three years.
Of the oﬀences being compared, these two (wilfully causing great
suﬀering and aggravated assault) may be the most similar. Interestingly
the UCMJ version applies to attempts and completed acts, while the ICC
oﬀence only applies to the completed acts. The ICC oﬀence encompasses
mental pain or suﬀering while the UCMJ version is limited to bodily harm.
Again disparity between the possible punishments arises: the ICC crime
yields a sentence range up to thirty years while the UCMJ is generally
limited to three years. Even when the qualiﬁers are considered, the UCMJ
42
43

Ibid., art. 8(2)(a)(iii).
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 928 art. 128 (2010).
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punishment only increases to ﬁve years for a child victim and eight years
when a ﬁrearm is used.

D Destruction of property
The crime of extensive destruction and appropriation of property is
deﬁned in the Rome Statute as occurring when:
1. The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property.
2. The destruction or appropriation was not justiﬁed by military
necessity.
3. The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out
wantonly.
4. Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protected status.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
international armed conﬂict.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established
the existence of an armed conﬂict.44
Article 103 of the UCMJ provides that the crime of looting or pillaging
captured or abandoned property occurs in the following circumstances:
1. That the accused engaged in looting, pillaging, or looting and pillaging by unlawfully seizing or appropriating certain public or private
property.
2. That this property was located in enemy or occupied territory, or that
it was on board a seized or captured vessel.
3. That this property was
(i) left behind, owned by, or in the custody of the enemy, an
occupied state, an inhabitant of an occupied state, or a person
under the protection of the enemy or occupied state, or who,
immediately prior to the occupation of the place where the act
occurred, was under the protection of the enemy or occupied
state; or
(ii) part of the equipment of a seized or captured vessel; or

44

Rome Statute, above n. 34, art. 8(2)(a)(iv).
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(iii) owned by, or in the custody of the oﬃcers, crew, or passengers on
board a seized or captured vessel.45
The maximum punishment is ‘any punishment, other than death, that a
court-martial may direct’.46
The striking feature of the UCMJ charge is that it represents a rare US
military oﬀence – one that only applies to armed conﬂict or during times
of military occupation. Although anachronistic, this oﬀence nonetheless
demonstrates the potential for broader oﬀences unique to armed conﬂict
to apply to US service members.

V Conclusion
The above discussion demonstrates that in some ways the crimes in the
UCMJ and the Rome Statute are analogous, but in other ways they are
not. The enumerated UCMJ oﬀences are more generalised, allowing for
application both during peacetime garrison settings and during armed
conﬂict. But in that generalisation, it can be claimed that something is
lost. Is the same oﬀence in a garrison setting really the same as when it is
committed in an armed conﬂict? For intra-military oﬀences, for example
one service member assaulting another, the answer may be yes. But where
the victim of the oﬀence is not American and the armed forces are
deployed in an armed conﬂict environment the answer would appear to
be negative. The question becomes whether the various intrinsic and
extrinsic values of the US military justice system – designed to promote,
protect, and defend – operate in a domestic setting in the same manner as
they do in an armed conﬂict.
One senior US military prosecutor has commented that charging
decisions ultimately reﬂect the narrative the prosecutor wants to convey
to a jury. It is diﬃcult to envision a case where adding elements, including
the existence of armed conﬂict or of a protected person, would render
that endeavour easier. A pragmatic approach to prosecutions is not
unique to the United States.47 The diﬀerences may be explained by
degrees – a domestic military charge would apply to a lower ranking

45
47

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 903 art. 103 (2010). 46 Ibid.
Interview with Beth Van Schaack, Deputy Chief of the US Oﬃce of Global Criminal
Justice describing actions by ICTY prosecutors to employ charges that obviate the need
for conﬂict classiﬁcation and the use of joint criminal enterprise as a more eﬀective
modality than traditional forms of command responsibility.
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individual, whereas a ‘war criminal’ must be an authority ﬁgure. Or, it
could be argued that property destruction is appropriately addressed by
the UCMJ, and that a war crime act of the same conduct would, or
should, constitute a graver crime.
Yet the US approach rings hollow, maybe not in an absolute sense but
certainly in a relative one. The United States has been involved in armed
conﬂict for over ten years and claims to be in an era of ‘persistent
conﬂict’48 which it believes will exist for ‘the next several decades’.49
This negates an argument that armed conﬂicts are not long enough to
warrant unique military charges.50 Nor is the argument that speciﬁc
oﬀences should only exist when they occur with some degree of frequency particularly persuasive given the presence in the UCMJ of
oﬀences such as abusing a public animal and hazarding a vessel. But
fatally problematic for the US pragmatism argument is that law of war
oﬀences are detailed and employed against detainees subject to US
military commissions.51 For either reason, and certainly for both reasons,
the United States should modify the charges employed against its own
service members.
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Pete Geren and George W. Casey Jr, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army
2009 Submitted by The Honorable Pete Geren and General George W Casey JR to the
Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of
Representatives 1st Session, 111th Congress (Washington, DC, May 2009) (introduction).
See also Mary L. Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2012) arguing that war is not an exceptional state but the
unfortunate status quo.
Moreover, as discussed above, the US military manual for courts martial has for some
time contained a few conﬂict speciﬁc oﬀences.
This inconsistent approach to the way in which the United States charges its service
members versus the enemy is not new. During World War II, the US Army courtmartialled its own service members for killing enemy prisoners of war for murder,
while prosecuting Germans who committed similar acts against US POWs for violations
of the laws and customs of war. See US011 Case No. 6–24 (US v. Valentin Bersin et al.).

